As we shall see in chapter 3, the Tiantai school of Buddhism advocated a version of panpsychism without such beliefs, and this demonstrates that the panpsychist thesis stands on its own, and is logically independent of the claim that mentality can somehow be attributed to the universe as a whole.

Generally speaking, elements of panpsychism in phenomenology are faint at best. In [Graham] Harman's opinion, "It's safe to say that there is no panpsychist strain anywhere in the phenomenological movement."

Panpsychism is a family of views whose basic principles are that the mental is both fundamental and ubiquitous.[…]Panpsychism can be usefully contrasted with the opposing doctrine of *emergentism: the view that certain attributes apply to complex systems which do not apply to the system's constituents.

[Anne Conway's] treatise, the first philosophical paper published by a woman, was one of the first modern articulations of panpsychism, the idea that consciousness is fundamental to the natural world.

Whitehead devised such a conception, which to my mind definitely supersedes the panpsychisms of the history of metaphysics.

The genius of modern panpsychisms has proved to be their capacity to incorporate rather than reject the mechanistic point of view.

This seems to be due to one factor that they all—the various idealisms, phenomenalisms, positivisms, and panpsychisms—have in common: They reject, or at least fail to endorse, the idea of “matter.”

Panpsychism

Meaning

Noun

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